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THE “FOUNDATIONS” OF
ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM — OR, TAKING
THE NINTH AMENDMENT LIGHTLY:
A COMMENT ON DANIEL A. FARBER’S
BOOK ON THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Thomas B. McAffee*
An essay review of: DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:  THE
“SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS
DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007).
The Ninth Amendment has served two purposes in constitutional discourse – to
refute “textualists” and “originalists,” and to supply the historical grounds for read-
ing the Constitution as a “rights–foundationalist” document.  Professor McAffee’s
review of Professor Farber’s book on the Amendment raises the question whether,
given his prior rejection of “foundationalism,” Professor Farber is able to reconcile
these two ends.  The review also suggests that, even if the Amendment did grow from
the environment that gave us the Declaration of Independence, its history gives us
reason to doubt that its purpose was to provide for the legal enforcement of unstated
moral claims, or natural rights.  Indeed, Professor McAffee contends that the pur-
pose of the Ninth Amendment was to protect the rights retained residually by the
system of limited powers granted to the national government under the Constitution.
However, even if we would read the text and history differently, Professor Farber’s
work seems ultimately at least as committed to his “pragmatism” as it is to instilling
reverence for the claims of unenumerated rights.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Amendment states that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.”1  The Amendment has served two central functions in the constitu-
tional discourse of the last two decades: it has, first, supplied a handy refuta-
tion of the views of  “originalists” and “textualists;”2 it has, second, provided
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
The author thanks the William S. Boyd School of Law for supporting scholarship and Jesse
Panoff for assisting in the drafting of this review.  He thanks as well the following legal
scholars for looking over this piece:  A. Christopher Bryant, Lynne Henderson, Stephen B.
Presser, Steven D. Smith, and William Van Alstyne.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
2 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1988); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1990) [hereinafter McAffee, Original Mean-
ing].  The point is illustrated in Professor Farber’s recent book. DANIEL A. FARBER,
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historical and textual grounding for a “rights-foundationalist” reading of
America’s written Constitution.3  Thus, it is novel to have Professor Daniel A.
Farber, who has criticized “originalism” precisely for being a form of founda-
tionalism,4 produce a work, Retained by the People:  The “Silent” Ninth
Amendment and the Constitutional Rights Americans Don’t Know They Have,
that is based on arguments that appear to establish a “rights-foundationalist”
account of the Constitution.  On the one hand, the anti-foundationalist book
Professor Farber co-authored in 2002 contended that the Constitution’s framers,
including James Madison, “changed their views over time,” which means that
any perusal of the historical record is “bound to yield conflicting expressions of
intent.”5  Historical research may thus be potentially “illuminating,” but almost
never “controlling.”6  On the other hand, we now learn that if “it is true that
history often fails to provide clear proof of what the Framers believed, there are
exceptions[,]” and the “Ninth Amendment is one of them.”7  According to Pro-
fessor Farber, the purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to prevent a narrow
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, the sort advocated, for example, by legal
scholar, Judge Robert Bork.8
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:  THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHTS MOST
AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 85 (2007) [hereinafter FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY
THE PEOPLE] (asserting that “most Americans” agree there are unenumerated rights and that
“Bork’s contrary view was one reason why his nomination to the Supreme Court
foundered”).
3 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 10-11 (1991) (“[R]ights-founda-
tionalists” are those who contend that “the American [C]onstitution is concerned, first and
foremost, with their protection;” in their view, “the whole point of having rights is to trump
decisions rendered by democratic institutions that may otherwise legislate for the collective
welfare.”). Accord Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 61, 92 (1996) (“[The] rights-foundationalist account of the Constitution has
potentially profound implications for our legal order, as well as for the practice of judicial
review.”).
4 DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:  THE MIS-
GUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 10-28 (2002) [hereinafter FARBER &
SHERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS] (supplying a critique of the views of Robert Bork
and other Originalists).
5 Id. at 16.
6 Id.  Originalists are thus scholars who, perhaps naively, “look at history and find clear
directions.” Id. at 13.  Considering that Professor Farber identifies himself as a nonoriginal-
ist, however, an implication of his own position is that we are not necessarily bound even by
the Framers’ clear directions.
7 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 9. If we ask whether a right
must be secured by the Constitution’s text, Professor Farber tells us that “the Constitution
speaks very plainly.” Id.  He writes:  “Is the list of specific rights protected by the Constitu-
tion complete?  The Ninth answers, ‘Of course not,’ clearly and succinctly.” Id.  One pur-
pose of the Framers, he assures us, was “to protect what constitutional lawyers call
unenumerated rights–those rights the Founders assumed and felt no need to specify in the
Bill of Rights.” Id. at ix-x.  Apparently the Framers were not originalists, except when it
came to rejecting originalism; then they were not only originalists, but also managed to state
their view that there are unenumerated rights quite clearly.
8 See generally id.  Proponents of the Constitution believed “that a bill of rights might be
not only ineffective but positively harmful, if it led to a devaluation of whatever rights were
not listed.” Id. at 28.  So the narrow interpretation that Bork engages in is simply the insis-
tence that for a right to be secured, it must be found in the text of the Bill of Rights.
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What is critical, we learn elsewhere in Professor Farber’s book, is that the
Ninth Amendment illustrates that the Framers “did not believe that they were
creating these liberties in the Bill of Rights.  Instead, they were merely
acknowledging some of the rights that no government could properly deny.”9
If the Constitution is designed to secure and protect all of our valid moral
claims, our “rights”–both those “enumerated” in the Bill of Rights, as well as
“unenumerated” rights–it quickly becomes difficult to conceive of why Profes-
sor Farber is not in fact advocating rights-foundationalism.  That riddle is a
subject to which we must return.
Professor Farber distinguishes, moreover, the Ninth Amendment from the
“historical accident” by which fundamental rights jurisprudence became
attached to “another–and less appropriate–part of the Constitution, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”10  “The result has been concep-
tual confusion and vulnerability to conservative critiques;”11 After all, we are
told, the Due Process Clause had “the wrong language and the wrong historical
background[,]” considering that “text and history have become crucial to con-
stitutional argument.”12
9 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at ix.
10 Id. at 2.
11 Id.  In Professor Farber’s mind, modern conservative legal thinkers present the kind of
thinking that needs an effective critique. See also id. at 8-9 (stating that in denying
unenumerated rights, “conservatives are doing precisely what the Framers feared:  denying
or disparaging the rights retained by the people”); id. at 11 (stating that according to “con-
servatives,” constitutional rights are “merely the historical product of particular language
adopted a century or two in the past” with “no broader roots or implications”); id. at 17
(contending that Justice Harlan, who dissented from many Warren Court decisions, “was
also the strongest advocate for protecting unenumerated rights,” and “was cast from a differ-
ent mold from that of today’s conservative legal thinkers”); id. at 70 (“[C]onservatives may
consider all of this just ‘pie in the sky,’ suitable for political debate but lacking in legal
significance.  The people who wrote our Constitution disagreed.”); id. at 208 (referring to
“movement conservatives” who are said to “believe in the vigorous application of govern-
ment authority as long as it does not impair their own interests,” as contrasted with “libertari-
ans” who apparently “genuinely believe in small government”).
While Professor Farber sees conservatives like Justice Harlan as from a different mold
from today’s conservatives because he advocated unenumerated rights, his treatment simply
omits that Justice Black rejected modern fundamental rights jurisprudence, with its commit-
ment to unenumerated fundamental rights, though he was one of the most  “liberal” and
“activist” members of the Warren Court.
12 Id. at 3.  Clearly, substantive due process has been subjected to withering critiques.  But
its harshest and most effective critics have been Charles Black, John Hart Ely, and Akhil
Amar–not to mention Professor Farber himself.  (All are leading “liberal” constitutional law
scholars who are (or were) on the faculties of leading American law schools.)  This is hardly
an all-star cast of “conservatives” in interpreting the Constitution.
Professor Farber also omits that prominent legal theorists and historians have endorsed
the fundamental rights construction of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., RONALD DWOR-
KIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 282 n.4 (2006) (arguing that “[t]hose who say that ‘substantive due
process’ is an oxymoronic phrase, because substance and process are opposites, overlook the
crucial fact that a demand for coherence of principle, which has evident substantive conse-
quences, is part of what makes a process of decision making a legal process”); James W.
Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered:  Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due
Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320 (1999) (observing that “the expression ‘law of the
land’ is sufficiently comprehensive to include substantive law as well as procedural safe-
guards”); Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
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Part II of what follows confronts the perceived connection between the
Ninth Amendment and the Declaration of Independence and section 1 of the
Virginia Bill of Rights.  Apart from whether the documents are as closely
related as is sometimes assumed, it is quite clear that the Virginia Bill of Rights
presented “moral admonitions” that were not treated as legal obligations.  In
turn, Part III sets forth an alternative understanding of the Ninth Amendment’s
securing other rights “retained by the people.”  Since the state legislatures held
“general” or plenary powers–and could thus exercise every power not “limited”
expressly by the state constitutions’ Declarations of Rights–the Federalists con-
tended that there was no need for a bill of rights since the Constitution
presented a “bill of powers,” where the people “retained” (as rights) all that had
not been granted (as powers).  The risk of including a bill of rights was pre-
cisely that some might infer that the national government was empowered to do
whatever it was not prohibited from doing by the Bill of Rights.  The Ninth
Amendment, then, was to ensure that a bill of rights would not support the
inference that Congress held general or plenary powers to do whatever was not
forbidden by the Bill of Rights.
Part IV sets forth the grounds for thinking that Professor Farber’s treat-
ment of the Ninth Amendment appears to yield a “rights-foundationalist”
account of the Constitution–except that Professor Farber is long on record as
preferring “pragmatism” to any form of “foundationalism.”  If the purpose of
the Ninth Amendment was to secure “innate rights,” as Professor Farber’s book
suggests, how can one insist that constitutional rulings both fulfill the purpose
of the Ninth Amendment, while also insisting that rights holdings be grounded
in history, text, or precedent?
II. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND RIGHTS FOUNDATIONALISM
The apparently “rights foundationalist” reading of the Ninth Amendment
grows from the historical thesis that it is properly read as in pari materia with
the Declaration of Independence and section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights.13
Indeed, the most rigorous proponent of this reading of the Ninth Amendment,
Professor Charles Black, contended that the Declaration of Independence was
itself fundamental law binding on the entire country, and that therefore the
107, 123 (1989) (relying on the Due Process Clause and contending that, on his reading, “the
only authoritative text (‘law’) for any legitimate decisions, even Roe v. Wade, is the written
document itself”); Robert C. Post, Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution:  Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 94 n.440 (2003) (concluding, based on use of word
“liberty” in text of the Due Process Clause, that the Due Process Clause provides “as much
meaningful guidance as does the word ‘equal’ in the Equal Protection Clause”).
13 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., “One Nation Indivisible”: Unnamed Human Rights in the
States, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 17, 26 (1991) (describing the Declaration of Independence as
“an obvious precursor of the [N]inth [A]mendment, operating in pari materia with that
amendment, and thus as an aid to the interpretation of the latter”). But see Thomas B.
McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism–What it Contributes to Contemporary Constitu-
tional Debate, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 617, 651 n.123 (1992) (observing that Black’s “plain mean-
ing” reading of the text and “attempt to shift the burden of proof to those who read it
differently,” simply ignores that the “rights ‘retained by the people’ can easily be read as a
reference to the rights retained by the people when they granted enumerated powers to the
national government”). See generally id. at 651-57.
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Ninth Amendment itself is appropriately applied both to limit the powers of the
nation as well as the powers of each and every state.14  Professor Farber is
enthusiastic about the Declaration of Independence, and the historical link
between it and the thinking of Republicans during Reconstruction.15  However,
Professor Farber still contends, contra Professor Black, that “the 1791 Bill of
Rights only limits the power of the federal government to violate rights.”16  In
offering this opinion, for some reason, Professor Farber perceived no need to
explain why he rejects the arguments for a more expansive reading offered by
Professor Black, even though the Republicans who created the Fourteenth
Amendment–whose views he relies on–construed the original Constitution as
securing rights against the states.17
Even so, the perceived connection between the Ninth Amendment and the
“inalienable” and “inherent” rights clauses of the early state constitutions sup-
plies the basic view defended in other works arguing for the “unenumerated
rights” construction of the Ninth Amendment.18  Consistent with their claims,
Professor Farber underscores the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights’ procla-
mation that “all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and inalienable rights.”19  In Professor Farber’s mind, the
Ninth Amendment is emblematic, illustrating that the Framers “did not believe
that they were creating these liberties in the Bill of Rights.  Instead, they were
merely acknowledging some of the rights that no government could properly
deny.”20  According to Professor Farber, one of the Framers’ purposes was “to
protect what constitutional lawyers call unenumerated rights–those rights the
Founders assumed and felt no need to specify in the Bill of Rights.”21
Professor Farber thus claims that Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence in
Griswold v. Connecticut22 “demonstrated” that “the language and history of the
Ninth Amendment show that the Framers of the Constitution believed in addi-
14 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM:  HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED (1997) [hereinafter BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM]. But see RANDY
E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)
[hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING] (advocating unenumerated fundamental rights construc-
tion of Ninth Amendment, but rejecting the view that the amendment served to limit the
power of the states).
15 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 56-59, 61-70.
16 Id. at 62.
17 See, e.g., id. at 62, 66-67.
18 See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 14; BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM,
supra note 14; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 241-60 (1999); CALVIN
R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS:  THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION’S
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995); DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONALISM 202-47 (1989) [hereinafter RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS]; BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 15, 26-30 (1980).
19 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 27. Compare PA. CONST. of
1776, Declaration of Rights, art. I, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLO-
NIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3081, 3082 (Francis
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter STATE CONSTITUTIONS], with VA. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, § 1, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS supra, at 3812, 3813.
20 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at ix.
21 Id. at ix-x.
22 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tional fundamental rights, protected from government violation, alongside those
listed in the Bill of Rights.”23  The Ninth Amendment’s reference to the
“others” that are “retained by the people” is simply a way of referring to
“innate human rights.”24  Professor Farber’s purpose is thus “to revive our
understanding of the American tradition of reverence for fundamental rights.”25
Unenumerated fundamental rights “were based in ‘natural law’ and the ‘law of
nations.’”26  If the inclination of some to completely deny the existence of
these innate human rights is a source of frustration for Professor Farber, it is
altogether exasperating that
Some conservatives acknowledge that the Ninth Amendment, like the Declara-
tion of Independence, refers to innate human rights.  But they contend that these
unenumerated rights lack any legal weight and were merely entrusted to the political
process.  This theory conveniently allows these conservatives to pretend belief in
innate rights without ever having to do anything about them.27
Professor Farber thus concludes that conservatives “refuse to look seri-
ously at what the Framers believed, how they saw the world.”28
If we begin with Professor Farber’s own assumption, linking the Ninth
Amendment to the Virginia Declaration’s “inherent rights” clause, a serious
legal historian would have profound doubts about whether its language was
designed to make natural rights legally enforceable.29  Professor G. Alan Tarr,
perhaps the leading modern scholar on state constitutions, referred specifically
to section 1 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights in describing the purposes of
the Framers in drafting such provisions:
[T]he insusceptibility of various provisions to judicial enforcement was not a flaw,
because the declarations were addressed not to the state judiciary primarily but to the
people’s representatives, who were guided by them in legislating, and even more to
the liberty-loving and vigilant citizenry that was to oversee the exercise of govern-
mental power.30
23 Id. at 1-2.  For another conclusion about how persuasive and compelling Justice
Goldberg’s construction of the Ninth Amendment in Griswold was, see the treatment of that
case in THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, JAY S. BYBEE & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT, POWERS
RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES:  A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH
AMENDMENTS 226-38 (2006).
24 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 4.
25 Id. at 15.  Professor Farber also contends “advocates of fundamental rights should stop
being defensive and should make it clear that they, rather than their opponents, best represent
the American constitutional tradition.” Id.
26 Id. at 4.
27 Id. at 4-5.  Professor Farber is especially critical of Justice Antonin Scalia for combining
an acknowledgment that a claimed right may be “retained” by the Ninth Amendment with
the conclusion that it still may in effect have “no legal standing.” Id. at 5. But see Thomas
B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions:  The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
747, 792-93 (2001) [hereinafter McAffee, Inalienable Rights].
28 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 11.
29 My own views on the relation between Virginia’s “inherent” rights clause and the Federal
Constitution are set forth in THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTI-
TUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY:  THE FOUNDERS’ UNDERSTANDING (2000) [hereinafter
MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS];  McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 27.
30 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 78 (1998).
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We learn from others that the state declarations, then, presented “moral
admonitions” that were not treated as binding legal obligations.31  This is what
enabled Alexander Hamilton to argue that expressly stating the doctrine of pop-
ular sovereignty, and thereby acknowledging the authority of the people to
amend their constitutional system to better meet their needs and to secure their
rights, was more effective than a bill of rights.32  According to Hamilton, the
Preamble’s reference to the power of “the people” was “a better recognition of
popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal fig-
ure in several of our state bills of rights, and which would sound much better in
a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.”33  Modern Americans
have difficulty understanding that, for Hamilton and many others, the most
important “right” held by the people was the right to “alter or abolish” their
form of government; this “right” enabled them to amend the Constitution to
more effectively serve their needs, including protecting their rights.34  From
this perspective, ultimately “the proper guardians of rights are the peo-
ple–whose sovereignty constitutes the most basic right of all.”35  The critical
difference between the state Declarations of Rights and the Federal Bill of
Rights was precisely that James Madison, apparently inspired by words sup-
portive of a bill of rights offered by Thomas Jefferson, substituted words of
command and prohibition for the hortatory language that had dominated the
Declarations of Rights.36
31 LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY 74 (1991). See also Donald S. Lutz, Political Participation in Eighteenth-
Century America, 53 ALB. L. REV. 327, 328 (1989) (observing that eighteenth century state
constitutions “were not viewed as legalistically as they are today”).
32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 578-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
33 Id. at 579.  For a useful treatment, see Nathan N. Frost, Rachel Beth Klein-Levine &
Thomas B. McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions Revisited:  Unwritten Constitutionalism in
the States, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 333, 360-62.  Hamilton’s perspective reflected not only a
skepticism of declarations of rights as mere “parchment barriers,” but also a conviction that
the people as the perpetual sovereign were empowered to amend the Constitution if govern-
ment acted in ways that threatened rights. Cf. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION 382-84 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION] (“We the People” is “tantamount to a volume and contains the essence
of all the bills of rights that have been or can be devised.”).
34 VA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 3, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 19, at 3812-13 (providing that “a majority of the commonwealth hath an indubi-
table, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish . . . [their government], in
such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal”).
35 GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST:  DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 153
(1989). Accord JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 244 (1999) (stating if the
question framed is, “[w]ho shall decide what rights we have,” his answer is, “[t]he people
whose rights are in question have the right to participate on equal terms in that decision;”
also supplying reasons for concluding that we should not “instead entrust final authority to a
scholarly or judicial elite”).
36 For a historical treatment of Jefferson’s role and Madison’s decision to redraft the lan-
guage that had been proposed by the state ratifying conventions, see McAffee, Inalienable
Rights, supra note 27, at 769-71.  At one point, Professor Farber himself makes a point of
underscoring that the Ninth Amendment “is an explanation, not a command.” FARBER,
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 9. Even if it were a command, it does not
even purport to limit the scope of federal powers.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ107.txt unknown Seq: 8 10-FEB-09 10:01
Fall 2008] THE “FOUNDATIONS” OF ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM 233
Whatever the originally intended meaning of the Ninth Amendment, at
least twenty-six states adopted state constitutional provisions that significantly
tracked the language of the federal Ninth Amendment.37  Even though some
have attempted to justify deriving unenumerated fundamental rights from such
provisions,38 when the United States Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Con-
necticut,39 not a single state in the union held that such provisions secured
rights beyond those specified in constitutional text.40  This bit of history simply
confirms that “the state counterparts to the Ninth Amendment have not gener-
ally been viewed as stating enforceable limits on government power.”41
A number of modern thinkers believe that proponents of using seemingly
open-ended rights provisions may well be motivated by high ideals, but are
overestimating the capacities and inclinations of real-world judges.42  Such
proponents often assume that the Justices could ensure that all our lives will be
protected by natural law.43  However, as the legal theorist, Philip Soper, has
observed, when judges feel free to implement natural law, “the system remains
positivist in the most significant sense, with the judges simply serving as the
sovereign in place of the legislature.”44  The very purpose of having a written
37 Frost, Klein-Levine & McAffee, supra note 33, at 362 n.152 (citing JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 203 n.87 (1980)).
38 E.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 280-83
(1998); ELY, supra note 37, at 203 n.87; Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 171, 182 (1992); John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42
EMORY L.J. 967, 1008-35 (1993).  For a strikingly different reading of the same history, see
Frost, Klein-Levine & McAffee, supra note 33, at 362-71; McAffee, Inalienable Rights,
supra note 27, at 771-92.
39 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40 McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 27, at 791.
[T]hat it was not until 1965 that the Ninth Amendment was invoked to justify heightened scru-
tiny of legislation impacting on unenumerated fundamental rights, and in a federal rather than a
state court, suggests the significance of the silence that had previously prevailed on the issue of
the applicability of the incorporation of an “unenumerated rights” interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment state equivalents.
Id.
41 Id. at 779.
42 For exemplary efforts at articulating such concerns, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON (1998); Thomas B. McAffee, Substance Above All: The
Utopian Vision of Modern Natural Law Constitutionalists, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501
(1995) [hereinafter McAffee, Utopian Vision]; Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of
Humility in Judicial Review:  A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997); Larry Alexander, Book Review, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 396 (1990) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEO-
PLE (1989)).
43 See, e.g., BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM, supra note 14; see also BARNETT,
RESTORING, supra note 14.
44 Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2393,
2415 (1992).  Given the freedom Professor Farber’s reading of the Ninth Amendment poten-
tially grants to judges, Professor Alexander suggests that “perhaps one of our moral rights is
a right against judicial imposition of specific rights that lack a textual basis.”  Alexander,
supra note 42, at 403.  Professor Alexander concludes:
If the [N]inth [A]mendment was intended to legitimize such judicial imposition, then, on the
basis of proper preconstitutional norms, those that tell us why and to what extent the Constitution
is authoritative and what interpretive methodology we should apply to it, we should reject the
constitutional authority of the [N]inth [A]mendment.
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Constitution is to enable government leaders to determine whether they have
the power and authority to act in a certain way by empowering judges to vindi-
cate “the legal entitlements of one party or another.”45  Professor Larry Alexan-
der has contended that there are three reasons to “advert to a text–to provide
certainty, separate powers, and monitor decisionmakers.”46  But when the text
is taken as an open-ended invitation, “these rule of law values” are simply
abandoned in favor of an “unbridled naturalism.”47  It would be useful if
“thoughtful American lawyers realized that rights-grounded foundational
accounts of our constitutional order are bad history that produce bad law.”48
III. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND ENUMERATED POWERS
When Pennsylvania’s James Wilson attempted to explain and justify the
proposed Constitution’s omission of a bill of rights, he stated:
When the people established the powers of legislation under their separate govern-
ments, they invested their representatives with every right and authority which they
did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question, respecting the
jurisdiction of the house of assembly, if the frame of government is silent, the juris-
diction is efficient and complete.  But in delegating federal powers, another criterion
was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority is to be collected, not
from tacit implication, but from the positive grant expressed in the instrument of
union.  Hence it is evident, that in the former case [of the states] everything which is
not reserved is given, but in the latter [case of the federal Constitution] the reverse of
the proposition prevails, and everything which is not given, is reserved.49
Wilson stated a general understanding of the power granted to the legisla-
tures by the state constitutions.
That the premise underlying Wilson’s argument was fundamentally posi-
tivist in nature is illustrated powerfully by the example he uses to make the
point.  Wilson contended that if Congress had been granted a power “to regu-
late literary publications,” it would have been essential to “stipulate that the
liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate.”50  Virtually all the Framers,
Id. (citation omitted).
45 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGI-
NAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6 (1999).
46 Alexander, supra note 42, at 401.
47 Id.
48 McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 27, at 794.
49 James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 167-68.  When it came to the state constitution Declara-
tions of Rights, Wilson accordingly embraced “the sort of narrow interpretation of the Bill of
Rights that Bork engages in.” FARBER & SHERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 4, at 18.
As the historian, James H. Hutson observed, Madison feared that without a Ninth
Amendment, “it could be assumed that the people retained only the rights contained in the
first eight amendments; every other right/power would, according to the example of the state
bills, be ceded to the government, which would become a leviathan in possession of virtually
unlimited power.”  James H. Hutson, The Bill of Rights and the American Revolutionary
Experience, in A Culture of Rights:  The Bill of Rights in Philosophy, Politics, and
Law–1791 and 1991, at 62, 94 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
50 James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 167, 168.  For a demonstration that Wilson’s arguments
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including James Wilson, would have seen freedom of the press as one of the
inalienable rights to which they were entitled.51  Thus, Wilson was not relying
on a general implication that inalienable rights are in fact constitutional rights.
The necessity of a bill of rights, if rights were to be secured in the states, was
an implication that followed from the presumption that the states held plenary
powers.  The implication was the starting point for analysis by Wilson,
Madison, and the other Federalist proponents of the Constitution.52  The ple-
nary powers of the state legislatures was the basis for the Federalist argument
that there was no need for a federal bill of rights under its system of enumer-
ated and limited powers.53  However, that power remains unmentioned in the
two hundred pages of Professor Farber’s book on the Ninth Amendment.
The history of the ratification debates demonstrates that both the Federal-
ist proponents of the Constitution and the Constitution’s Antifederalist oppo-
nents agreed that the only rights that the people had “retained” under their state
constitutions, as a matter of law, were the express limitations on government
power found in that states’ Declarations of Rights.54  The debate between these
parties concerned whether the people’s rights were adequately secured by the
federal system of enumerated and limited powers, and whether there were
undue risks to attempting to supplement that protection by the inclusion of a
federal bill of rights.55  The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was therefore not
to secure “unenumerated” natural and inalienable rights, but to assure that the
insertion of a federal bill of rights would not undermine the security already
provided by the enumerated powers scheme.
Professor Farber observes that Justice James Iredell of North Carolina
stated that it would “not only be useless, but dangerous” to enumerate rights,
because “it would be implying in the strongest manner, that every right not
included in the exception might be impaired by the government without usurpa-
tion; and it would be impossible to list them all.”56  Professor Farber thus con-
were that a bill of rights would threaten the rights-protective scheme of enumerated powers,
see MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 94, 137, 140-42.
51 See, e.g., Plain Truth:  Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, in 2 RATIFICA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 219 (stating as “Congress can only have the
defined powers given, it was needless to say anything about liberty of the press, liberty of
conscience, or any other liberty that a freeman ought never to be deprived of”).
52 See DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL:  WHIG POLITICAL
THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 60 (1980) (Framers of state constitutions
“assumed that government had all power except for specific prohibitions contained in a bill
of rights.”).
53 E.g., Melancton Smith’s Notes, (Sept. 27, 1787), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 335 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (Nathaniel Gorham
explaining that a “bill of rights in state governments was intended to retain certain powers
[in the people] as the legislatures had unlimited powers.”).
54 See, e.g., Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic:  The Origin of the American Tradi-
tion of Political Liberty 422 (1953) (quoting Theophilus Parsons as emphatically asserting
that right “ought to be settled and established, previous to the ratification of any constitution
for the State”).
55 FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS:  THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION 151-52 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1998) (observing that Federal-
ists thought a bill of rights “not only unnecessary, but . . . even . . . dangerous”).
56 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 34; see also 4 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
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cludes:  “So the effect of a bill of rights would be to imperil every right that got
left off the list.  In short, what the Federalists were afraid of was that someone
would use the listing of some rights as an excuse for trampling others.”57
However, Justice Iredell himself was very clear that, just as there was a highly
debatable need for a federal bill of rights, what made such a bill of rights dan-
gerous was the analogy that might be drawn to the state constitutions:
If we had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights would
not only have been proper, but necessary; and it would have then operated as an
exception to the legislative authority in such particulars.  It has this effect in respect
to some of the American constitutions, where the powers of legislation are general.
But where they are powers of a particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the
case of the [proposed] Constitution before us, I think, for the reasons I have given, a
bill of rights is not only unnecessary, but would be absurd and dangerous.58
The Federalist fear was uniformly stated that a bill of rights could be
understood as acknowledging that Congress was empowered to act generally,
as long as it did not violate the provisions of the bill of rights.59  The insertion
of the bill itself might be read, in other words, as “converting” the federal
government to one of general powers.  For example, Justice Samuel Parsons
contended that inserting a bill of rights would carry the implication “that noth-
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 167 (William S. Hein & Co. 1996) (1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES]).  In the same speech Iredell argued that “[i]t would be the greatest absurdity for
any man to pretend that, when a legislature is formed for a particular purpose, it can have
any authority but what is expressly given to it . . . .” Id. at 166.  He concluded that “Con-
gress can have no right to exercise any power but what is contained in that paper,” and
though “unalienable rights ought not to be given up,” such rights “are not alienated.” Id. at
166-67.  Why are they not alienated?  “They still remain with the great body of the people.”
Id. at 167.
57 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 34.  Using the same argu-
ment as advanced by Iredell, Professor Richards goes so far as to assert that Iredell was
fearful that one day a strict constructionist positivist–like Judge Bork–would reject a prof-
fered rights claim because the right was not included in the enumeration of the Bill of
Rights. Compare RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 221 (describing Iredell’s argu-
ment as “the most prophetic expression of the founders’ fears about a Bill of Rights not
protecting unenumerated rights”), with McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 2, at 1268
n.210 (observing that Richard’s “lengthy quotation ends at the point where Iredell focused
on the uniqueness of the [F]ederal [C]onstitution and acknowledged that a bill of rights
would be both ‘necessary’ and ‘proper’ if ‘we had formed a general legislature’”). See infra
note 60 and accompanying text.
58 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 56, at 149.  Iredell’s speech was part of a colloquy with
Samuel Spencer, who had argued that a bill of rights was essential to secure “those unalien-
able rights which ought not to be given up.” Id. at 137 (emphasis added).  It was also
Spencer who contended that if the Constitution included a clause that stated “that all [that]
was not given up to the United States was retained by the respective states,” the clause
“would have superseded the necessity of a bill of rights.” Id. at 152.  For helpful discussion,
see Hutson, supra note 49, at 95.
59 See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28,
1787), 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 387-88 (“A proposition to
adopt a measure, that would have supposed that we were throwing into the general govern-
ment every power not expressly reserved by the people would have been spurned at, in that
house, with the greatest indignation.”).
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ing more was left with the people than the rights defined and secured in such
bill of rights.”60
Professor Farber joins a well-established tradition of ridiculing Judge
Bork’s thought that the apparent reference to unenumerated rights in the Ninth
Amendment should be treated as the equivalent of an “ink blot” following the
words “The enumeration . . . of certain rights, shall not be construed to . . . .”
–and the inkblot prevents an “interpretation” of particular individual rights.61
The strong appeal of the “inkblot” analogy for Judge Bork critics is that it
implicitly suggests that the central issue in Ninth Amendment interpretation
relates to the presumed vagueness of referring to protected rights without sup-
plying even a clue as to their identity.62  Thus, Judge Bork can be perceived as
simply imposing his “moral skepticism” on the Constitution–even though the
text and (presumed) original understanding seem to embrace the reality of
moral rights, as well as a willingness to secure natural rights that are not
expressly stated in the Constitution.63
Even apart from the fact that the Virginia Bill of Rights’ “inherent” rights
provision has been given a standard interpretation over the years that effec-
tively treats it as the equivalent of an “inkblot,”64 the decisive question raised
by the historical materials concerns the “ambiguity” of the Ninth Amendment’s
reference to “others retained by the people,” not its “vague” reference to
unenumerated rights.65  In Ninth Amendment analysis, the crucial question is
60 Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3 THE DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 569 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1978).  Hence the Ninth Amendment “is a disclaimer, denying that the federal Bill of Rights
is similar to any of the other American bills of rights adopted since independence.”  Hutson,
supra note 49, at 95.  The Federal Bill of Rights would in effect concede all power not
reserved there; it would create a government of plenary powers–similar to the power held by
state legislatures.
61 See FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 4.  Professor Farber also
concludes that the comparison to an “inkblot” meant, for Bork, that “unenumerated rights
simply do not exist.” Id. at 4, 11-12 (contending that “inkblot” analogy reflected Bork’s fear
“that if we paid any attention to the Ninth Amendment at all, we would be mesmerized into
giving the federal judiciary a blank check”).  For similar disparagements, see BARNETT,
RESTORING, supra note 14, at 79, 242, 253-55, 325; BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM,
supra note 14, at 35; Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment:  Inkblot or Another Hard
Nut to Crack?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67 (1988); Randy E. Barnett, Ninth Amendment
(Update), in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1813, 1813 (Leonard W.
Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000).
62 See McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 27, at 792-93.
63 Id. at 792 (citing to authorities who viewed Bork’s “inkblot” analogy as reflecting a deep
moral skepticism; Bork’s view made the Ninth Amendment “another hard nut to crack”).
64 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
65 The difference between overly vague terms and ambiguity can be crucial precisely
because, since ambiguity refers to “equivocation,” it is frequently resolvable by a careful
reading of the provision in its broadest context. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRE-
TATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 43-48 (1975); id. at 48 (concluding that when a
careful reading dissolves what initially appeared as ambiguity, the term “apparent ambigu-
ity” is often used).  By contrast, while vagueness often adds to the “flexibility” of statutes,
the whole point may be to leave the resolution of uncertainties to others than the legislature
adopting the enactment. Id. at 49-50.  For the treatment of the importance of ambiguity
versus vagueness in accurately construing the Ninth Amendment, see Thomas B. McAffee,
Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought:  The Presumption in Favor of Liberty
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whether the other rights are “retained” by virtue of the grant of enumerated,
limited powers to the national government, or are “retained” as people leave the
state of nature and join the social contract.66
Modern thinkers seldom even note the parallels between the text of the
Ninth Amendment and Article II of the Articles of Confederation.  Article II
provided “[e]ach state retains . . . every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States.”67  If one
realizes that “the people,” as the popular sovereign, were the functional
equivalent of the states under the Articles of Confederation, it becomes clear
that it is “the people” who grant, or delegate, power to the national government,
and reserve or “retain” whatever is not granted or delegated, just as “the states”
did under the Articles.  This is why President George Washington could argue
that there was no need for a bill of rights, because “the people evidently
retained every thing which they did not in express terms give up.”68  As Profes-
sor Kurt T. Lash has argued,
that the Ninth Amendment speaks of the people’s retained rights does not establish
the character (collective or individual) of the rights so retained.  Nor does the fact
that many Founders believed in natural rights conflict with a federalist reading of the
rights retained under the Ninth.69
At the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, Archibald Maclaine, a Feder-
alist proponent of the Constitution, analogized to Article II when he contended
that the people “retain all of those rights which we have not given away to the
general government.”70  Similarly, in private correspondence, Richard Parker
wrote to fellow Virginian, Richard Henry Lee, that “we declare that we do not
abridge our Rights by the reservation but that we retain all we have not specifi-
cally given.”71
Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1506 n.25, 1573-
74 (2006).
66 For my own efforts to work through this puzzle, see Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of
Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights “Retained” by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J.
267 (1992).
67 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II, in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 86, 86 (emphasis added).
68 Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Apr. 28, 1788), in 29 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 475, 478 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939). Accord State-
ment of Thomas Hartley at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 30, 1787),
reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 429, 430 (contending
that the people had “retained” all the rights they had not transferred “to the government”);
Thomas Hartley, House of Representatives Journal (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 2 BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY History 1050, 1091 (1971) (asserting
that “all the rights and powers that were not given to the Government were retained by the
States and the people thereof”) (emphasis added).  Washington and Hartley were advancing
the same defense of the initial omission of a bill of rights that Madison had relied on in The
Federalist Papers. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
69 Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331,
364 (2004).
70 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 56, at 141 (emphasis added).
71 Letter from Richard Parker to Richard Henry Lee (July 6, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS:  THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 260, 260
(Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991) (emphasis
added).
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IV. FOUNDATIONALISM VERSUS PRAGMATISM
Professor Farber’s book consists of both a historical synopsis of the Ninth
Amendment and a review of how the Ninth Amendment might be imple-
mented.  In summing up the history, Professor Farber contends that an argu-
ment “that surfaced repeatedly was that it would be impossible to enumerate all
of the rights and that leaving some out might be taken as a negative signal.”72
He assures us that the “Ninth Amendment was a direct response to this con-
cern.”73  According to Professor Farber, the Ninth Amendment is properly read
as premised on the idea that there are “innate human rights,” and that they
should be given legal effect.74  Hence, he rejects any view that unenumerated
rights “lack any legal weight” or were “entrusted to the political process[,]”75
and urges us to grasp “that basic premise of the Founding Fathers:  human
rights come first, and legal regimes come second.”76  At first blush, it appears
that Professor Farber is committed to “rights foundationalism.”
Professor Farber acknowledges that positivism has come to dominate
twentieth century legal thought even as he underscores that “[n]atural law con-
tinues to play an important role in American law well into the nineteenth cen-
tury.”77  In general, the tone and texture of Professor Farber’s treatment
appears to track with that of his former colleague and co-author, Professor
Suzanna Sherry, who once suggested that modern state court judges should be
committed – as earlier courts were–to “the goal of doing justice,” not invoking
the “judicial restraint and strict constructionism” that has prompted them to
forget “the natural law heritage they once shared with the federal courts.”78  A
reader of the works of Professors Farber and Sherry would quite straightfor-
wardly expect the authors to set forth a full-blown theory of natural law and
natural rights as the means of implementing their vision of the Ninth Amend-
ment and its purpose.79
However, a “straightforward” natural law/natural rights theory of constitu-
tional decision-making is an unlikely request to be fulfilled by either of these
law professors–such an approach, we should know, only “transforms a lower-
72 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 29-30.
73 Id. at 30.
74 Id. at 4.
75 Id. at 4-5.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Id. at 8.
78 Suzanna Sherry, Foreword:  State Constitutional Law:  Doing the Right Thing, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 935, 943 (1994). See also Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Consti-
tution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987) [hereinafter Sherry, Unwritten Constitution].  As
with Professor Farber, a relevant question is whether “Sherry’s more recently articulated
views are reconcilable with those set out” in her work on the state constitutions.  Frost,
Klein-Levine & McAffee, supra note 33, at 338 n.20.
79 There are some who have made just such an attempt. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING,
supra note 14.  Professor Farber tells us, however, that Barnett, a libertarian, confuses
“rights, which come in discrete packages, and liberty, which is a vaguer concept of
unrestricted action.” FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 209.  But a
reader of Professor Farber’s book might come away unconvinced that he even believes in
natural rights.
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case theory into an upper-case Grand Theory,”80 and hence would be altogether
too foundationalist and insufficiently pragmatic.81 Professor Farber thus under-
scores that he wants to use the Ninth Amendment “in a sensible way, not just as
an open-ended invitation for judges to select their own preferred social values
for constitutional protection.”82  One should not hope to find an exposition of
how to go about finding “innate human rights;” after all, for these professors,
they do not have much to do with it.  Instead, to Professor Farber it is clear that
“[w]hether the source is divine sanction, the social contract, the inherent nature
of human dignity, or evolving social values, the key point is that these rights
are basic to our understanding of individual freedom in modern society.”83
The attempt to do more, by resorting to “sweeping ethical precepts,” at the
cost “of close reading of legal texts,” will yield a result that sounds “more like a
moralist than a lawyer.”84  Such a moralist will portray the Bill of Rights “as a
manifesto of high moral principle rather than a limited set of eighteenth-century
precepts;”85 he or she will likely, as a result, be “equivocal about how much
judges are restrained by their need to remain faithful to governing legal
sources.”86  Such moralists’ views are “agenda-driven rather than grounded in
constitutional history, text, or precedent.”87  What Professor Farber never really
explains is how judges, let alone constitutional law scholars, are to be faithful
to the purposes for including the Ninth Amendment in the Bill of Rights with-
out becoming a “foundationalist,” who is also a “moralist.”88
At least as fundamental, Professor Farber offers no help at all in resolving
the question whether and how the “pragmatism” he advocates is at all reconcil-
able with charging judges with discerning and enforcing “innate” human
80 FARBER & SHERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 8 (quoting M.H.
Abrams, The Transformation of English Studies:  1930-1995, in AMERICAN ACADEMIC CUL-
TURE IN TRANSFORMATION:  FIFTY YEARS, FOUR DISCIPLINES 123, 134 (Thomas Bender &
Carl E. Schorske eds., 1997)).
81 For a sense of how one might go about formulating a “pragmatic” approach to judicial
review, see Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis:  Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-
First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163 (1995); Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2003).
82 FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 14.
83 Id. at 16.
84 FARBER & SHERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 122.
85 Id. at 133.  A reader of Professor Farber’s recent book might well imagine that the whole
point of the Ninth Amendment was to clarify that the Bill of Rights was intended as a
“manifesto of high moral principle.”  The other rights “retained by the people” is said to
include all the rights identified as “innate human rights” by natural law theory.
86 Id. at 134.
87 Id. at 137.
88 Professor Farber suggested that a reading of the Ninth Amendment premised on the view
that, like the “inalienable rights” clauses, it was not written to be legally enforceable “conve-
niently allows these conservatives to pretend belief in innate rights without ever having to do
anything about them.” FARBER, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 5. Does
the demand that a claimed right be adequately “grounded in constitutional history, text, or
precedent,” FARBER & SHERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 137,
almost equally allow pragmatists to “pretend belief in innate rights” without doing much
about them?
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rights.89  Should a court encounter a previously unknown right, but conclude
that it fits within the category of “innate” rights, even though it lacks an antece-
dent in positive law, the legal tradition, or societal consensus, Professor Far-
ber’s own pragmatism should prompt him to doubt whether the judges’ beliefs
about moral facts should prevail over conflicting beliefs of legislators or
litigants.
Professor Farber, in short, does not offer his reader a full understanding of
why the “straightforward” reading of the Ninth Amendment he presents–the
one that focuses on “innate” human rights–would not amount in practice to a
form of “radical anti-constitutionalism.”90  The natural law/natural rights adju-
dication, suggested by Professor Farber’s reading of the Ninth Amendment,
appears to raise doubts about the constitutional validity of all morally contro-
versial enactments of positive law, including provisions of our written Consti-
tution–even amendments adopted recently by an aroused public.91  Indeed, if
the considered judgment of a Supreme Court Justice was that “equal represen-
tation of jurisdictions of unequal population violates the principle of one per-
son, one vote[,]” that Justice, using Professor Farber’s reading of the Ninth
89 If there are truly “innate” human rights, whether found in constitutional text or not, it is
difficult to conceive of how they would not pose potential substantive limits on the power of
the people to amend their constitutions. See, e.g., Sherry, Unwritten Constitution, supra
note 78, at 1132-35, 1145-46. But see MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 14-19,
123-27.
90 Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 89, 97 (1988).  A nearly standard reading of the unenumerated fundamental
rights construction of the Ninth Amendment is to “assume that these unwritten rights were in
conflict with the written constitution;” it would follow that the “unwritten rights could trump
the positive law of the Constitution.”  Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994).  For a description and critique of various attempts to address this
objection to the fundamental rights interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, see McAffee,
Utopian Vision, supra note 42, at 534-47.  Professor Farber only distinguishes himself in not
even making the attempt to address the objection, or even to explain how the search for
innate human rights is to be done so “pragmatically” as to avoid any need to consider it.
91 Compare Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100
YALE L.J. 1073 (1991) (contending that the proposed constitutional amendment to permit the
statutory prohibition of flag burning conflicts with the free speech that is an inalienable
natural right that is secured by the Ninth Amendment), with McAffee, Inalienable Rights,
supra note 27, at 781 n.136 (pointing to evidence that the concept of being ruled by the
“consent of the governed” is at the foundation of the American republic).
The author of this student note, Jeffrey Rosen, became a law teacher and scholar, and
recently published a book. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE
COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006).  In the book’s “Preface,” Rosen suggested that:  the book
defends the “tradition of bipartisan judicial restraint.” Id. at xiii.  Associated with Holmes,
Frankfurter, and Hand, this view “holds that courts should play an extremely modest role in
American democracy.” Id.  “They should hesitate to strike down laws unless the constitu-
tional arguments for second-guessing the decisions of a political majority are so powerful
that people of different political persuasions can readily accept them.” Id.  The assumption
is “that the most controversial political issues in American history have been resolved in the
political arena rather than the courts.” Id. at xiv.  “When judges take it upon themselves to
decide the most divisive questions of politics, technology, and culture, who can blame both
liberals and conservatives for selectively embracing judicial activism when it suits their pur-
poses?” Id.  It is difficult to discern whether Rosen has repudiated his initial interpretation
of the Ninth Amendment or just become a pragmatist.
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Amendment, should properly hold that “the equal representation of the fifty
states in the Senate” is unconstitutional.92
V. CONCLUSION
There was a time when advocates of an activist judiciary in fulfilling the
promise of individual rights freely stated that the Constitution–and in particular
the Ninth Amendment–justified the use of “non-interpretive” judicial review.93
More recently, the trend has been to follow scholar Ronald Dworkin, who con-
tends that a basically moral reading of the American Constitution is justified by
a fair reading of the Constitution’s text.94  Despite this trend, however, the legal
scholar who initially insisted that the Ninth Amendment could justify the
employment of “non-interpretive” judicial review, Professor Thomas Grey, has
suggested that appropriate and legitimate constitutional decision-making would
be adequately characterized–given the Ninth Amendment–as at least “supple-
mental,” rather than as purely “textual[ ].”95  However, neither Professor Grey
nor Professor Farber supplies adequate grounds for reading a provision dedi-
cated to “innate human rights” as one that creates an “exception” that invaria-
bly upholds positive law, which also happened to be written and ratified as
fundamental law.96
92 McConnell, supra note 90, at 96.  If one were sufficiently committed to the Ninth
Amendment’s embracing all “innate human rights,” one might even deem that commitment
as overriding the strict instruction of Article V of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. V
(providing “that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate”).
93 Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 714
(1975).
94 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION (1996). See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
(2001); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:  THE CASE OF AUTON-
OMY (2006); see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES:  A THEORY OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985).
95 Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 211
(1988).
96 If our conclusions about the appropriate substantive content of fundamental rights leads
to legitimate change over time as our understanding and appreciation of basic principles
improves–prompting us to recognize the need to “supplement” the rights guarantees pro-
vided for in the text–it would be equally impossible to determine a priori that these changing
conclusions might not conflict with positive law provisions already included in the
Constitution.
